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ABSTRACT
Multicast Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF) is an en­
hancement to unicast routing protocol OSPF. It has been 
widely used in many multicast applications for years. How­
ever, its security is still a major concern in some applica­
tions. Much work has been done on data protection, but 
only a few works have been done on member access con­
trol mechanisms. In this paper, we present a new secure 
multicast architecture and protocol for MOSPF from the 
perspective of member access control. Our new model in­
cludes a variant of previous access control mechanism and 
a novel distributed encryption scheme. This architecture in 
particular meets the access control security needs of dense 
multicast routing protocol in MOSPF, simplifies the access 
control process, and increases scalability and flexibility in 
revocation and reauthorization.
KEY WORDS
MOSPF, Access Control, Multicast 
1 Introduction
Multicasting provides an efficient communication mecha­
nism in both private networks and Internet for large-scale 
content distribution, such as audio and video conferences, 
web casting, interactive game and video on demand. There 
are three basic types of multicast routing protocols: dis­
tance vector, link state and shared trees [1]. MOSPF be­
longs to the category of link state [2, 3], MOSPF is also 
called dense-mode multicast routing protocol, because it 
requires some form of flooding of datagrams to the net­
work to find multicast routes. This protocol is suitable for 
areas with dense concentrations of group members.
MOSPF is widely used in multicast but the security 
issues are still a concern where confidential and high value 
content are being transferred. Based on the properties of 
the multicast, the components that should be secured in­
clude^, 5]: multicast distribution tree protection, end-to- 
end data protection through cryptographic operations and 
member access control. The end-to-end data protection in­
cludes data integrity, source authentication and data con­
fidentiality. The main method used to protect the data 
is group key encryption, in which the multicast traffic is 
encrypted with a symmetric key and all authorized group 
members are given the decryption key. Many schemes 
were proposed to provide the efficient re-keying for the 
group key management protocol [6, 7]. These methods can 
become very complicated because the membership is dy­
namic. In addition, as mentioned in [4], there are some 
other related issues where encryption of communications 
may not be possible for legal reasons; furthermore, even 
where data confidentiality is provided, it may be possible 
to do traffic analysis depending on the layer where encryp­
tion is done.
Because of the above reasons, research was done to 
develop group access control schemes as an additional se­
curity mechanism [5, 8, 9]. In this paper, we propose a new 
secure multicast scheme and protocol for MOSPF based on 
a broadcasting encryption scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec­
tion 2 introduces the security architecture for multicast and 
the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and re­
views the proposed member access control schemes. Sec­
tion 3 describes the MOSPF protocol architecture. Section 
4 gives the novel distributed encryption scheme that is used 
in the scheme. Section 5 presents our new secure multicast 
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Finally, in section 6, 
we give some concluding remarks.
2 Security Architecture for Multicasting
This section briefly reviews security architecture, Internet 
Group Management protocol and related proposed work 
[10,11,5, 9],
The multicast security (MSEC) working group of the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) presents a multi­
cast security architecture reference framework (Figure 1). 
This Reference Framework is used to classify functional 
areas, functional elements, and interfaces. In Figure 1, the 
boxes are the functional entities and the arrows are the in­
terfaces between them.
There are three sets o f functional entities and three
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functional areas. The three sets o f functional entities are the 
Policy Server, Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS), 
Sender and Receiver.
The three functional areas are Multicast data han­
dling, Group key Management, and the Multicast security 
policies. Multicast data handling covers problems concern­
ing the security-related treatments of multicast data by the 
sender and the receiver. Typically, the data needs to be en­
crypted by group key and authenticated in a secure multi­
cast group. Group Key Management is concerned with the 
secure distribution and refreshment of keying material. The 
keying material refers to the cryptographic key belonging 
to a group, the state associated with the keys and the other 
security parameters related to the keys. The multicast secu­
rity policies cover aspects of policy in the context o f mul­
ticast security and must provide the rules for operation for 
the other elements of the Reference Framework. Our new 
secure multicast architecture and protocol for MOSPF will 
follow this reference framework.
F U N C T IO N N A L
A R E A S
M ulticast
Security
Policies
G ro u p
Key
Management
Multicast
Data
H andling
Figure 1. Multicast Security Architecture Reference 
Framework
2.1 IGMP Protocol
The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is the 
protocol through which hosts exchange information with 
their local routers. This protocol is specified in [11], It is 
used by IPv4 systems (hosts and routers) to report their IP 
multicast group memberships to any neighboring multicast 
routers. IGMP lets a router keep track of IP membership 
on its local LANS by 2 types IGMP messages: sending 
IGMP host membership queries and receiving IGMP host 
membership reports.
We note that the multicast provides an open group 
model. This open model has many beneficial aspects, but 
it also causes security issues, as it cannot control member­
ship to a set o f authorized hosts. Security problems include 
eavesdropping, theft o f service, denial of service and pos­
sibly cryptanalysis. The next section will discuss possible 
solutions to addressing these issues.
2.2 Member Access Control Schemes
As mentioned before, the open group model properties of 
the multicast may cause serious security problems. On the
other hand, the traditional methods used to cryptographi- 
cally encrypt information cannot solve these problems. To 
solve these security problems, we need to control the ability 
of hosts to join the multicast group. There are three func­
tions required for multicast receiver access control. It in­
cludes group policy specification functions, access request 
functions and access control functions [4, 9], The proposed 
solutions can be found in [5, 9, 12], Depending upon the 
type o f revocation provided, these multicast receiver autho­
rization solutions are classified into three types: central­
ized, ACL supported and time-limited.
In [5], Hardjono and Cain present an approach that 
makes use of the existing Group Key management protocol 
for host members o f a group to deliver the IGMP keying 
material to the host and the multicast distribution tree to de­
liver the necessary keying material to the multicast routers. 
The receiver host sends a join request including the access 
token to the router, and the router verifies the access token 
in the token list. In [12], Ballardie and Crowcroft present a 
version of IGMP that allows receivers to be authorized be­
fore joining the group. The architecture includes the group 
owner (the initiator), the authorization server, the routers 
and the receiver hosts. The group owner (the initiator) dis­
tributes the ACLs to the authorization servers. The receiver 
host sends a request to an authorization server to obtain 
an authorization stamp. When the receive host joins this 
group, it sends a join request to the router with this au­
thorization stamp. Then the router forwards the receiver 
host’s request to the authorization server for approval. In
[9], Judge and Ammar proposed a comprehensive architec­
ture GOTHIC for providing group access control.
2.2.1 Gothic Architecture
Figure 2. Gothic Architecture
In this section, we briefly describe the Gothic ar­
chitecture proposed in [9]. Our new scheme extends the 
Gothic architecture and provides a novel group key man­
agement scheme that enables the management of multi­
cast groups to be efficient. The Gothic includes two sys­
tems: the group policy management system and the group
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member authorization system (Figure 2). The group policy 
management system performs group policy specification 
functions. It includes three components: the group owner, 
the group owner determination and authentication system 
(GODAS), and the access control server (ACS). The group 
owner provides the security policy for the group and the list 
of the authorized members to the ACS. The group owner 
determination and authentication system (GODAS) pro­
vide the system to verify that the host is the group owner. 
The group member authorization system carries out access 
request functions and access control functions. This system 
involves the interaction among the host, the router and the 
ACS.
This system works as follows. First, the group owner 
contacts the ACS, and the ACS performs the authentica­
tion and authorization. Then the group owner provides the 
group policy to the ACS. Next, the receiver hosts request 
a capability from the ACS. These capabilities are identity 
based and time limited. After this, the receiver host can 
send a join request along with the capabilities that it re­
ceived from its ACS to the router. The router host authenti­
cates the receiver host and verifies the capabilities. Finally, 
the receiver host is allowed to join the group.
3 MOSPF (Multicast Open Short Path First) 
Architecture
In this section, we will briefly introduce the MOSPF ar­
chitecture [3]. Figure 3 shows a sample a MOSPF config­
uration (Nx-the network, RTx- the router, M-the member, 
H-the host, number is the cost from the routers to network).
Figure 3. MOSPF Architecture
MOSPF is an extension to OSPF unicast routing pro­
tocol. OSPF routers use link state advertisements (LSAs) 
to understand all available links in the network and route 
datagram along least cost paths. MOSPF includes multicast 
information in OSPF link state advertisements (LSAs) to 
construct multicast distribution trees. All MOSPF routers 
maintain an up-to-date image of the topology of the entire 
network. The path of the multicast datagram depends on
both the datagram’s source network and destination multi­
cast group. Group membership LSAs are flooded through­
out the OSPF routing domain so MOSPF routers can com­
pute outgoing interface lists. The MOSPF routers use the 
Dijkstra algorithm to compute shortest path tree for each 
group.
Each MOSPF router in the distribution tree for each 
source/destination combination bases its forwarding deci­
sion on forwarding cache. A forwarding cache entry is built 
from local group database and datagram’s shortest path 
tree. The local group database records the group member­
ship of the router’s directly attached networks. This local 
group database is built from the Internet Group Manage­
ment Protocol (IGMP). In multi-access network, one router 
is selected as Designated Router (DR); this Designated 
Router originates a network links advertisement on behalf 
of the network and becomes adjacent to all other routers on 
the network. The router updates the local group database 
when the membership state is changed. The datagram’s 
shortest path tree depicts the intermediate hops taken by a 
multicast datagram when it is sent from the source to the in­
dividual group members. This shortest path tree is built on 
demand. It is built by using the router-LSAs and network - 
LSAs in the link states database and having the source net­
work as root. The branches that do not include the router 
and transit networks are pruned from the tree.
For our new secure multicasting protocol, we need to 
add the encryption key into the LSA control messages, so 
that all the routers can store the encryption key to verify the 
prospective members.
4 Key Generation Algorithm
Our approach involves the proposal o f a dynamic group key 
management scheme that enables secure and efficient up­
dating of group members. We achieve this by constructing 
a public key that is associated with several associated pri­
vate keys. Our proposal for secure multicasting is based on 
our earlier work on key distribution described in [13].
4.1 Preliminaries
The security of our scheme is based on the difficulty of 
computing discrete logarithms, and the protocols are based 
on the polynomial functions and a set of exponentials.
Let N  be a composite o f two large primes, p, q,Z*N be 
a multiplicative group of order 4>(N) =  (p — l)(q  -  1), 
and g € Z$(n) be a generator, Let Xi Z9 for i =  
0 ,1 ,2 , . .. ,n  be a set of integers. A polynomial function 
of order n  is constructed as follows: f ( x )  =  n iL ifa  ~ 
Xi) =  E j= o  aix% m°d ‘KA’), where the a* are coefficients: 
a0 =  rT)'=l(—x j)> a l =  E i= l )>•••> an- 2 =
E iW C -Z iX -Z f) , «n—1 =  E " = l ( - Xl)> “n =  1- Note 
that f ( x j )  =  EIU aix j  ~  We can use this property to 
construct a broadcasting encryption system. Note that we
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require <j>(N) to be a composite o f a large set of primes in 
order to generate keys.
Having the set {a;}, we can then construct the corre­
sponding exponential functions,
{ g a\ g a\ g a\ - , g a n }  =  { go,  g i ,  9 2 , - , g n }-
4.2 System Setup
The construction of the encryption and decryption keys is 
done as follows:
• Select n  distinct random numbers Xj e  for i =
1,2, • • •, n, which form a set X n and a subset X m C 
X n.
• C om puted  =  n ; = i ( n r o ^ ) m°diV. Note that 
A  is computed once only. We will see later, a dy­
namic further updates of the system do not require re­
computation of A.
• Select an integer b e  Z^(jv) and compute its multi­
plicative inverse 6_1 such that bb~l =  1 mod^(7Vr).
• Compute Xj = b~ 1 x ? ntod^(7V), for j  =
1 .2  n.
•  Compute Xj =  s^x", where
Sj =  s\s'2 SjSj =  s ' mod<j)(N), sjt  s'- 6 Z 0(JV).
We note that this construction requires </>(N) to be a com­
posite of many primes; therefore, must be properly
chosen to suit this construction.
These values satisfy the equality:
A S g S b S j  g S i ,  =  1  m 0 d N t  Vj- 6 {1J 2,
A  is kept by the authorized server and will be used as 
the encryption key. Since the encryption key is not pub­
lic, there is no need for us to protect it against any illegal 
modification.
Xj and Xj are given to user j  as its secret decryption 
key during the process o f its registration. Hence the private 
decryption key doublet is (X j , X j ) .  Please note that compu­
tation of A  is a one-time task. The server does not need to 
modify it during a system update.
4.3 Multicasting Encryption Protocol
The encryption key A  is used to encrypt a session key that is 
then used to encrypt a message. All members in the group 
can decrypt the session key and then decrypt the message 
individually with their private keys. Let us suppose that M  
is the message to be encrypted and k is a session key.
The protocol is as follows:
• Select an integer r  6 r
•  Compute g  = g sr  mod N  and g =  g sbr mod N .
• Compute the ciphertext c =  E k { M ) and k! — 
k A sr mod A , where Ek(-) denotes a symmetric key 
encryption function.
• Broadcast the 4-tuple (g , g , c, fc') to all subscribers.
To decrypt the session key, the user j  computes
fcijjXjgXj _  j, moci tv. k is then used for the decryption 
o f the message.
5 A New Secure Multicast Architecture for 
MOSPF
In this section, we will present our new secure multicast 
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. As we discussed be­
fore, traditional methods are still prone to threats such as 
eavesdropping, theft o f service, or denial of service. The 
proposed solutions are inadequate for large dynamic multi­
cast group memberships. Our new secure multicast scheme 
for MOSPF is partly based on the Gothic architecture men­
tioned earlier; it includes two systems namely the group 
key and policy management system and the group member 
authorization systems (Figure 4).
Area 1
Figure 4. Secure Multicast Architecture for MOSPF
5.1 Group Key and Policy Management Sys­
tem
Except for the group policy specification functions men­
tioned before in the Gothic system, the group key and pol­
icy management system also performs the access control 
key generation and group session key generation functions. 
The group key and policy management system involves 
three parts: the group owner (for example, Host3 in Figure 
4), the access control server (ACS) and the group owner 
determination and authentication systems (GODAS). The 
group owner generates group access control keys, group 
keys for the group. It also provides the list o f authorized 
members and other security policy for the group to ACS. 
The multicast security policy can be referred to [14], The 
access control server (ACS) is used to verify and authorize 
the prospective member, and it also involves in the group
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member authorization system. The group owner determi­
nation and authentication systems (GODAS) can be used to 
verify that the host is the group owner [9],
The first solution makes use of group certificates (Fig­
ure 5). This is similar to traditional digital certificates.
Figure 5. Group Owner Certificates
The second solution is the use of a group ownership 
service (Figure 6). This service is a query/reply protocol 
based service. It works in 4 different multicast environ­
ments. It includes the multicast address allocation architec­
ture (MAAA), the source specific multicast (SSM), GLOP, 
and Session Announcement Protocol (SAP) /  Session De­
scription Protocol (SDP).
Figure 6. Group Ownership Service
5.2 Group Member Authorization System
Group member authorization system is the main part of 
controlling access to the group. This system performs 
the access request and access control functions. It al­
lows a prospective group member authorized to become a 
group member. This system involves three components: 
a prospective member host, a router and the access con­
trol server (ACS). We assume that the presence of a public 
key infrastructure, otherwise we can use the digitally sign 
messages method [9]. The group owner generates the dis­
tributed encryption key pairs (A, s) and decryption keys (x  
and x), as discussed in the last section. We also assume 
that there is one access control server (ACS) for the con­
venience of describing this protocol. The access control 
authorization protocol is described as follows.
5.3 Authorization Protocol
The group member authorization system includes the inter­
action between the host and ACS, and the interaction be­
tween the host and the router. This system also assumes 
the presences of the public key infrastructure (PKI).
•  {K+h ,K _ h )  denotes the prospective member hosts 
public key and private key pair
•  ( K +acs, K —acs) denotes ACS public key and private 
key pair.
•  (K +x,C E R T k +!L) denotes the trusted authority key 
and signed certificate
1 Authorization 
REQ
Authentication
Authorization
2 Authorization 
ACK
(A, SnrJ
© 3 Join REQ 4 Join ACK
Authentication
Figure 7. Basic Authorization protocol
The interaction between the prospective member and 
the ACS includes the following:
1. H  -> A C S  : A R  = [G I D , C E R T K+h}K_h
2. A C S  —> H  : A A  =  C A P  =  [[I P H, D N H, G ID ,
T ex p i X j ,  C E R T K+acB\K_acB]K+h
Here
•  A R  denotes authorization request
• C A P  denotes Capability
• G ID  denotes the group ID
• A A  denotes authorization acknowledgement
• D N  denotes the host’s distinguished name
• X j  denotes the member decryption key p a ir [ i j , x j ]
The interaction between the prospective member and 
the Router includes:
3. H  R  : J R  = C A P
4. R  — H  : J A  = S ta tu s
Here
•  J R  denotes join request
•  J  A  denotes join acknowledgement
First, the prospective member sends an authorization 
request to the access control server (ACS). This authoriza­
tion request (AR) includes the group ID that the member 
want to join and his/her public key certificate, which is 
signed by his/her private key.
Second, the access control server authenticates the 
prospective member and decides if this prospective mem­
ber can be authorized by checking the group policy from 
the policy server. Then the access control server returns 
an authorization acknowledgement (AA). If the request is
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successful, the prospective member will receive the decryp­
tion key (x  and x  ), which is encrypted with the prospective 
member’s public key.
Third, the access control server updates the encryp­
tion key (A, S )  to (A , S new). As we discussed before, we 
only need to change the S  in this case. This can then be 
transferred to one of the MOSPF router as part of the link 
state advertisement (LSA) information. Based on the MO­
SPF routing protocol, all the routers of the area will store 
this information. We assume that the routing control mes­
sages are secure, which can use the OSPF digital signature 
[15].
Finally, the prospective member sends the join request 
to the router that is the designated router if the prospec­
tive member connected network has more than one router. 
Because the router already has the distributed encryption 
key, the router can verify whether the prospective member 
is qualified. If successful, the prospective member is ac­
cepted as a formal member.
5.4 Reauthorization and Revocation
The group member needs to refresh their membership state 
to coincide with the soft state of the IGMP group member­
ship reports and of the routing protocol. In this scheme, 
the router can encrypt the control messages and only the 
qualified members have the decryption key in the group. 
The group owner can cancel the member who has left by 
changing the encryption key. On the other hand, the mem­
ber who has left can also rejoin the group; the group owner 
only need to change the encryption key. We can see that 
this new scheme can achieve efficient revocation and reau­
thorization.
This new secure multicast architecture and protocol 
for MOSPF has the following advantages comparing to 
the previous proposals [5, 9, 12]. First, this scheme sim­
plifies access control protocol process by adding a group 
control encryption key into the MOSPF LSA control mes­
sages. This is because the access control server does not 
need to transfer the prospective member’s certificates to re­
lated routers every time. Next, the scheme is flexible and 
the group owner can revoke a member at any time; other 
proposed schemes can not do this, whether they use a capa­
bility like token or a time limited token. Furthermore, our 
scheme is scalable, when the group is dynamic with mem­
bers joining and leaving frequently. This is a major advan­
tage of our scheme over the previously proposed ones.
In this scheme, we assume that the router is trusted 
and can receive group messages. One can easily envisage a 
slight variation of the scheme which uses a hybrid method 
by employing group session key and the group key man­
agement protocols to enhance the system and to achieve 
higher levels o f security.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented a new secure multicast 
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Our new scheme 
involves a novel distributed encryption scheme and sim­
plifies the access control process. The proposed scheme 
has good scalability properties and achieves efficient 
revocation and reauthorization. Currently, we are in the 
process o f conducting a simulation of our proposed scheme 
to analyse the performance issues.
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